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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , 
v s . 
JULIO GARY VALDEZ, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 19579 
STATEMENT QF ISSUES PRESENTED QN APPEAL 
The following issues are presented in this appeal: 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to support the jury's 
finding that defendant was guilty of first degree murder in the 
death of Christopher Swan? 
2. Was the evidence sufficient to support the jury's 
finding that defendant was guilty of first degree murder in the 
death of Carolyn Swan? 
3. Was the trial court's admission of evidence 
obtained during the execution of two search warrants reversible 
error? 
5. Did the trial court err in death qualifying the 
jury? 
6. Should the trial court have quashed the jury venire 
based upon alleged systematic exclusion of racial and ethnic 
minorities from the venire? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Julio Gary Valdez, was charged by , 
information with two counts of first degree murder, a capital 
offense, under UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202 (1978) (amended 1983, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1984, 1985) (R. 125). A jury trial resulted in verdicts of 
guilty as charged on both counts (R. 3229-30). After a penalty 
hearing, the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict of 
death on either count. The trial court then sentenced defendant 
to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment in the Utah State 
Prison (R. 386-7). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Conflicting evidence was received at the trial of this 
case. The following evidence presented by the State supported 
the jury's verdicts. 
In 1978, Carolyn Swan, a thirteen-year old Salt Lake 
City resident, became romantically involved with defendant, who 
was nineteen years old at the time (R. 1251, 1265). This was her 
first and only boyfriend (R. 1251, 1260). In March or April of 
1981, Ms. Swan ran away from her parents1 home to live with 
defendant in his apartment. Shortly thereafter, her parents 
located her there and had her transported by the police to the 
juvenile authorities and then home (R. 1252-3, 1283, 1449-50). 
Ms. Swan continued to see defendant, became pregnant by him, and 
in October 1981 gave birth to a baby boy whom she named 
Christopher Valdez1 (R. 1258-9, 1268). 
In April of 1981, defendant met April Alkire and moved 
in with her one month later. In December 1981, Alkire became 
engaged to marry defendant (R. 1290, 1297). During the period 
* In the information charging defendant with first degree murder 
and throughout the trial the child was referred to as Christopher 
Swan (R. 125) . Accordingly, the State will use that name 
throughout its brief. -
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between April 1981 and August 1982f Alkire saw Carolyn Swan on 
numerous occasions at Alkire1s and defendant's residence. (R. 
1294, 1296-7, 1300). On one such occasion in January 1982, Ms. 
Swan entered their apartment without permission, confronted 
Alkire, and screamed at defendant. The incident ended when 
defendant went outside with Swan and talked with her for 30 to 45 
minutes (R. 1301-02, 1417-18). On July 11 of that same yearf 
when Swan spotted Alkire and defendant driving a Blazer on State 
Street, she chased their vehicle with hers and purposely hit the 
back end of it several times. After Alkire made obscene gestures 
toward Swan, defendant turned onto a side street where Swan drove 
her car into the side of the Blazer. Defendant, Alkire, and Swan 
got out of their vehicles and the latter two began screaming at 
each other. Swan lunged at defendant and scratched him before 
returning to her car and driving off (R. 1308-13). 
After this incident with the Blazer, Alkire pressed 
defendant to do something about Swan, indicating that if he did 
not, Alkire would leave him. She confronted him with information 
she had obtained about a paternity suit Swan allegedly had filed 
against him and urged him to hire an attorney to take care of 
this (R. 1314-18). On the morning of August 12, 1982, Alkire and 
defendant fought over this situation before she left for work. 
Later that day while Alkire was at work, she had a telephone 
conversation with defendant in which he told her in a "cold" 
voice that "all [her] problems were over and [his] hatd] just 
begun" (R. 1321-2, 1324-7). After work, Alkire returned home; 
defendant, who worked a 3:00 p.m. to midnight shift, was not 
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there (R. 1328) . Once inside their apartment, Alkire looked for 
a gun which, she testified, was about four feet long and in an 
upstairs closet; however, she was unable to find it. To Alkire1s 
knowledge, this was the only gun in the apartment. She then left 
the apartment at approximately 6:30 p.m. to go shopping with her 
mother and did not return until around 10:00 p.m. She showered 
and went to bed, falling asleep at about 11:00 p.m. (R. 1331-2, 
1713). Alkire had not had any contact with defendant the entire 
day, except in the morning prior to leaving for work and the one 
time at work by telephone (R. 1328, 1331). 
On August 12 at the Swan residence on Doreen Street in N 
Salt Lake City, where Carolyn Swan and her ten month old son, 
Christopher, lived with her parents, Carolyn had at least one 
telephone conversation with defendant (R. 1602-3). During the 
afternoon of that day, she told a friend who was visiting that 
she planned to meet defendant later (R. 1412). That evening, Ms. 
Swan told her father that she was going to meet defendant at 
approximately 12:30 a.m. the following morning at the corner of 
Gordon Lane and Doreen Street, a common meeting place for her and 
defendant about 200 feet from the Swan residence. Several hours 
before she left, Swan's father loaned her his wristwatch so that 
she could keep track of the time. She told him that she would 
not wait for defendant for more than ten or fifteen minutes and 
would not spend longer than that with him once he arrived (R. 
1441, 1444, 1601, 1604) . 
At 11:30 p.m., Carolyn entered her parents' bedroom 
with Christopher and spoke with them. She had put up her hair, 
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had on perfume, and wore a plaid shirt and a pair of jeans— 
clothes she saved for special occasions. Christopher wore blue 
overalls and a striped shirt. Neither of Swan's parents saw her 
or the baby after that. However, her father thought he heard the 
sound of a door at about midnight (R. 1263, 1438-9, 1443-4). 
At approximately 12:15 a.m. on August 13, a police 
officer driving home from work observed a woman with a small 
infant in her arms standing on the corner of Doreen and Gordon 
(R. 1470-8). Shortly before this at about 12:06 a.m., defendant 
punched out on his time card at his place of employment, Wheeler 
Machinery Co., located at 4901 West 2100 South in Salt Lake 
County (R. 1469, 1616). At 1:30 a.m. near the intersection of 
7000 South and 3200 West, a police officer pulled over defendant, 
who was driving his pickup truck, and issued him a citation for 
running a stop sign and displaying an expired registration 
sticker. Defendant was alone, and the officer did not observe 
anything suspicious about either defendant or his truck (R. 1499-
1510, 1527-30). That same morning near 5:30 a.m., April Alkire 
awoke, went upstairs, and found defendant sitting on the couch in 
the living room of their apartment drinking beer. He was still 
in his work clothes. Shortly thereafter, defendant told her a 
story about a "hit man" who called him at work, shot Carolyn Swan 
in a field, and then took the baby (R. 1683, 1686). 
Subsequently, Alkire telephoned her mother and related the story 
to her. The two of them manufactured an alibi which had 
defendant returning home after work in the early morning hours of 
August 13, eating dinner with Alkire, going with her to Alkire1s 
-5-
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parents1 residence and exchanging his pickup truck for a Blazer 
that was there, and then returning home. After Alkire suggested 
this alibi to defendant and rehearsed it with him, defendant made 
the switch of his truck for the Blazer and drove home in the 
Blazer that night after work (R. 1642-4, 1692-9, 1748-50). 
On the morning of August 13, Carolyn Swan's parents 
awoke to find her and Christopher missing. Their beds had not 
been slept in. An inventory of their belongings revealed that 
neither had taken any footwear with them, none of Christopher's 
foodstuffs were missing, and no luggage was gone (R. 1597-1600). 
Later that day Swan's father went to Wheeler Machinery, found v 
defendant, and asked him if he knew where Carolyn and Christopher 
were. After initially denying that he had plans to meet them the 
night before, defendant acknowledged that a meeting had been 
arranged but had never taken place. He told Mr. Swan that he had 
not seen them and did not know where they were (R. 16 07-8). 
After meeting with Swan's parents in the evening of 
August 13, Scott Miller, a deputy sheriff, contacted defendant by 
telephone at Wheeler Machinery and questioned him about his 
relationship with Carolyn Swan and whether he knew of her or her 
son's whereabouts. Defendant first denied having any contact 
with Swan on August 12, but then indicated that she had called 
him several times at work. He repeatedly said that he did not 
know where Carolyn and Christopher were, explaining that after 
leaving work the prior evening he had gone straight home except 
for a brief stop at a convenience store. After arriving home and 
eating dinner with his girlfriend, April Alkire, the two of them 
-6-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
had gone to bed (R. 1802-8). Two days laterf Miller, accompanied 
by a pair of detectives with the sheriff's department, 
interviewed Alkire and defendant at their residence. During this 
interview, in which both defendant and Alkire appeared extremely 
nervous, defendant told the officers essentially the same story 
about his activities after work on August 12 that he had 
previously related to Miller; however, he added that after 
dinner, he and Alkire had gone to Alkire's mother's residence and 
exchanged his pickup truck for a Blazer (R. 1811-14, 1839). 
Subsequently and pursuant to permission given them by defendant, 
police officers searched defendant's truck which was still at 
Alkire's mother's address. The officers gathered soil samples 
from the truck's fender wells and debris from the floor mats (R. 
1670-2, 1815-6, 1824-5, 1830). On August 16, the police 
impounded defendant's truck and searched it again pursuant to a 
warrant on August 18, recovering more soil samples from the 
fender wells and additional debris from the interior (R. 2396-7, 
2377-80) . 
On August 19, flood control workers on the Jordan River 
found Christopher Swan's decomposed body, face down in the water, 
caught in a headgate on the river at approximately 2100 South (R. 
1876, 1892, 1895-6). That same day, police officers arrested 
April Alkire. After receiving a grant of immunity, she made a 
statement to the police which differed from prior statements 
(which contained the alibi noted earlier) she had previously 
given them. Also, she gave the police permission to search her 
and defendant's apartment (R. 1709-11, 1349). On August 20, 
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officers executed a search warrant on that apartment and seized a 
gun case from an upstairs hall closet and several live .270 
caliber rifle cartridges (R. 1910f 1913, 1921). They also 
arrested defendant that day (R. 3). 
On August 22f Carolyn Swan's body was discovered under 
a scrub oak in an abandoned area of Lark, Utah (R. 2010-21, 2046-
8). Police officers investigating the scene found the following 
evidence: a spent .270 caliber cartridge located a short 
distance away from a large dried blood spot on the ground which 
contained what appeared to be bullet fragments and clothing 
fibers; and a trail of blood from that blood spot down a path to 
where Swan's decomposed body lay. Swan wore her father's 
wristwatch, but she was not wearing any shoes (R. 1980-9, 2003, 
2085) . 
At trial, Jerry Thompson, a homicide detective, 
testified that he performed a number of timed runs in his car 
over various routes from Wheeler Machinery (defendant's place of 
employment) to the corner of Doreen and Gordon (where Carolyn and 
Christopher Swan were to meet defendant), to the location in Lark 
where Carolyn's body was found, to a nearby access on the Jordan 
River at 7 800 South (where defendant could have thrown 
Christopher into the river), and back to the point where 
defendant was stopped and issued a traffic citation at 1:30 a.m. 
on August 13. Those runs, which were made between 11:00 p.m. and 
12:30 a.m. and within the speed limits, indicated that defendant 
could have left work shortly after punching out at 12:06 a.m. on 
August 13, driven the route described, and been at the point of .-t 
the traffic stop by 1:30 a.m. (R. 1544-93). 
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Monique Ryserf the state medical examiner, testified 
that Carolyn Swan died from gunshot wounds to the chest and the 
back of the neck, and that, given the condition of her body when 
found, she had been killed within a day of the last time she was 
seen alive—i.e., 11:30 p.m. on August 12. Ryser also testified 
that Christopher Swan had died from drowning within 24 hours of 
the last time he was seen alive on August 12 (R. 2358-9). After 
giving a detailed account of what happens to the body of a 
drowning victim in the water, Ryser then noted that the abrasions 
evident on top of the baby's head were consistent with it having 
scraped along the bottom of the river as the body drifted 
downstream (R. 2354-7, 2361).2 
Donald Havekost, an agent assigned to the elemental 
analysis unit of the F.B.I. Laboratory, testified that, after he 
analyzed the lead fragments recovered from the blood spot at the 
scene of Ms. Swan's killing and the lead bullets contained in 
several of the .270 cartridges seized from defendant's residence, 
he concluded that they had all come from the same batch of lead 
used in the manufacturing process (R. 2117, 2143-8). An 
associate of Havekost further testified that the cloth fibers 
found in the blood spot were from Ms. Swan's shirt (R. 1663-4). 
z
 Testimony was presented at trial which established that the 
Jordan River, which flows south to north, had a pea or sewer 
gravel bottom (gravel up to one inch in size) at 7 800 South which 
gradually became a muddy bottom downstream from that point (R. 
1881-2, 2600), and that in August 1982 nothing in the river 
between 7 800 South and 2100 South, including a diversion canal 
between 4500 and 4800 South, would present an impassable obstacle 
to a body the size of Christopher's (R. 2318-23, 2336). 
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Paul Schrecker, an agent assigned to the firearms 
identification unit of the F.B.I* Laboratory, testified thatf 
after examining "mechanism marks"3 on the spent .270 cartridge 
recovered in the area of Ms. Swan's killing and on three of the 
.270 cartridges seized from defendant's residence, he concluded 
that all had been in and out of the same firearm at some time. 
He also noted that gunshot residue found around a hole in the 
upper back portion of Ms. Swan's shirt indicated that she was 
shot at very close range (R. 217 5-2215). 
James Stephens, a mineralogist working for Kennecott, 
testified that, based upon his examination of soil samples taken 
from defendant's truck and the area in Lark where Ms. Swan's body 
was found, he believed it was "reasonably probable" both samples 
had come from the same place (R.2423-54). 
Michelle Garrick, an investigator for the Department of 
Social Services, testified that she telephoned defendant in June 
1982 and told him that Carolyn Swan had named him as 
Christopher's father. After defendant denied being Christopher's 
father, Garrick informed him that the case would be referred to 
the county attorney's office. When asked whether he wished to be 
served with a summons and complaint for the paternity action at 
work or at home, defendant indicated that he preferred to be 
served at home and then gave Garrick a false home address (R. 
2242-5). Sandy Mooy, an attorney with the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's Office, verified that his office had filed a paternity 
-9 
3
 According to Schrecker, "mechanism marks" refer to marks left 
on ammunition by the mechanisms of a weapon (R. 2185). 
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action against defendant, but that defendant had not been served 
(R. 2286-2300). 
Finallyf the State introduced evidence of outstanding 
maternity bills for Ms. Swan at L.D.S. Hospital, which defendant 
had failed to pay although he had promised to do so (R. 2088-
2102) . 
Defendant took the stand at trial and related the 
following version of the facts. He met Carolyn Swan in 1977 and 
had, in his words, an "up and down" relationship with her between 
1977 and 1982, which included several unpleasant confrontations 
between the two of them and between April Alkire and Swan. He 
verified the incidents with Swan, testified to by April Alkire, 
when Swan entered his apartment and confronted him and Alkire, 
and when Swan accosted him and Alkire as they drove along State 
Street (R. 1301-2, 1309-12, 2644-6). Defendant admitted that it 
was "highly possible" that Christopher Swan was his child (R. 
2622-38) . 
On August 13, 1982, in accordance with a plan created 
by April Alkire and her mother to "scare" Carolyn Swan, defendant 
left work shortly after midnight and drove his truck to the 
corner of Doreen Street and Gordon Lane where he picked up 
Carolyn and Christopher Swan and took them to an isolated area in 
Lark, Utah. There, a car approached defendant's truck. A man 
got out of the car, walked over to where defendant, Carolyn, and 
Christopher were, and asked for identification. After defendant 
and Carolyn exited defendant's truck, Carolyn began screaming at 
the man, who then shot her with a rifle. When defendant ran 
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toward the manf he pointed the rifle at defendant, grabbed 
Christopher out of the cab of defendant's truck, and left in his 
car. Defendant never saw the baby again. Defendant then left 
the scene, and on his way home, was stopped by a police officer 
and issued a traffic citation. Once home, he told Alkire what 
had happened (R. 2670-88). Subsequently, defendant discovered 
that his rifle was missing; but he saw it again when Alkire 
retrieved it from her mother's home, sawed it into small pieces 
with a hacksaw, and disposed of it. Defendant acknowledged that, 
after arriving home on August 13, he went along with an alibi for 
himself which was created by Alkire and her mother and involved 
the exchange of his truck for a Blazer at Alkire's mother's 
residence (R. 2690-6) . 
Defendant testified that, in August 1982, he owned only 
one gun, a .270 caliber rifle, which he kept in his residence (R. 
2617-8). He identified the gun case police officers had seized 
from his apartment as the one in which he kept his rifle. He 
also identified the seized ammunition pouch containing .270 
caliber cartridges as his (R. 2619-20, 2670). On cross-
examination, defendant admitted that he had denied fathering 
Christopher Swan to an investigator with the Department of Social 
Services and had given her a false address when asked where the 
summons and complaint in a paternity action could be served. He 
further admitted that he had been aware of the possibility of 
this paternity action against him—the loss of which would 
obligate him to support Christopher, had never legally 
acknowledged or obligated himself to Christopher, had only 
-12-
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infrequently given small sums of money to Ms. Swan for 
Christopherfs support, and had recognized that as long as Ms. 
Swan and Christopher were around he would be faced with social 
interference and the possibility of additional financial 
obligations (R. 2740-9). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support 
both of defendant's first degree murder convictions. Because 
defendant effectively asks the Court to reevaluate the weight of 
the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, something it 
has repeatedly declined to do on review, his insufficiency claims 
are without merit. 
Because the photographs of the victims' bodies were 
relevant to proving the charges against defendant and were not 
overly prejudicial, the trial court did not commit error when it 
admitted those photographs into evidence. 
Defendant fails to show that evidence seized from 
defendant's vehicle and his residence during the execution of two 
search warrants was unlawfully seized. Furthermore, he makes no 
showing that exclusion of the allegedly tainted evidence likely 
would have produced a result more favorable to him at trial. 
The issue defendant raises concerning death 
qualification of the jury was considered and decided against 
defendant in State v. Mooref 697 P.2d 233 (Utah 1985). Because 
that decision is in accordance with the majority, and better, 
view, this Court should again reject the argument defendant 
advances. 
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Finally, because defendant presented an inadequately 
supported motion to quash the venire and failed to establish a 
prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the 
trial court properly denied that motion* 
POINT I 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED AT TRIAL TO 
SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICTS. 
Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial 
was insufficient as a matter of law to support the jury's 
verdicts. His individual attacks on the two first degree murder 
convictions will be dealt with separately below. 
When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting a conviction, this Court has applied the 
following standard of review: 
This Court will not lightly overturn the 
findings of a jury. We must view the evidence 
properly presented at trial in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict, and will 
only interfere when the evidence is so 
lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable 
man could not possibly have reached a verdict 
beyond a reasonable doubt. We also view in a 
light most favorable to the jury's verdict 
those facts which can be reasonably inferred 
from the evidence presented to it. 
State v. McCardell. 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982) (citation 
omitted). As noted in State v. Booker. 20 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 
(Oct. 25, 1985): 
In reviewing the conviction, we do not 
substitute our judgment for that of the jury. 
"It is the exclusive function of the jury to 
weigh the evidence and to determine the 
credibility of the witnesses . . . ." S£aJt£ 
v. Lammr Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980); 
ancord State v. Linden. Utah, 657 P.2d 1364, 
1366 (1983). So long as there is some 
evidence, including reasonable inferences, 
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from which findings of all the requisite 
elements of the crime can reasonably be made, 
our inquiry stops. 
Id. at 28 (citation omitted). And, even if the Court views the 
evidence as less than wholly conclusive, or if contradictory 
evidence or conflicting inferences exist, the verdict should be 
upheld. State v. Howell. 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982). In short, 
"on conflicting evidence the Court is obliged to accept the 
version of the facts which supports the verdict." State v. 
Isaacson. 704 P.2d 555, 556 (Utah 1985), citing State v. Howell. 
649 P.2d at 93. 
A. 
Under UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202 (1) (b) , (f), and (h) 
(1978) (amended Supp. 1985), the State charged that defendant 
"intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Christopher N. 
Swan under the following circumstances: (a) At the time the 
homicide was committed the defendant also committed another 
homicide; or (b) The defendant committed the homicide for 
pecuniary or other personal gain; or (c) The defendant committed 
the homicide for the purpose of preventing a witness from 
testifying, or a person from providing evidence or from 
participating in any legal proceedings or official investigation" 
(R. 125) . The jury was instructed accordingly (Instruction Nos. 
1, 21, 26; R. 3238-9, 3257, 3263-4). On appeal, defendant argues 
that his conviction on that charge should be reversed because the 
evidence was insufficient to support it in three respects: (1) 
inadequate proof that defendant was Christopher's killer, (2) 
inadequate proof that defendant intentionally or knowingly caused 
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Christopher's death, and (3) inadequate proof on two of the three 
aggravating circumstances alleged. 
First, in claiming that there was insufficient evidence 
to support the jury's finding that he killed Christopher, 
defendant ignores two basic principles of appellate review: that 
circumstantial evidence alone may be competent to establish the 
guilt of the accused. State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 
1982), and that the trier of fact is not obligated to believe the 
evidence most favorable to the defendant rather than that 
presented in opposition by the State. State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 
at 97. In his brief, defendant does little more than urge the 
Court to disbelieve the testimony of certain State's witnesses 
and accept somewhat conflicting evidence favorable to him (see 
Brief of Appellant at 15-19). The State offered the testimony of 
Officer Thompson concerning driving times, that of Judy Dencker 
about her observation of a woman and a child in the early morning 
hours of August 13, and that of Ralph Gisseman regarding the 
possibility of a child's body being caught in a diversion 
structure in the Jordan River at approximately 4600 South, in 
support of its theory that defendant left work shortly after 
midnight on August 13, drove to the corner of Doreen Street and 
Gordon Avenue where he picked up Carolyn and Christopher Swan, 
took the Swans to a point in Lark where he shot and killed 
Carolyn, then drove a short distance to the Jordan River where he 
threw Christopher into the water, and was stopped by a police 
officer in the vicinity of 7000 South and 3200 West for a traffic 
violation at 1:30 a.m. Because defendant fails to show that the 
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testimony of these witnesses, or of any other Wat State witnesses 
offered in support of this theoryf was wholly improbable, his 
argument, which asks this Court to substitute its judgment for 
that of the jury in weighing the evidence and assessing the 
credibility of witnesses, is entirely without merit. Moreover, 
it is difficult to understand how defendant can seriously attack 
the driving time testimony put on by the State or the testimony 
of Dencker when defendant, in his own testimony, substantiated 
the accuracy of the State's evidence. 
Second, defendant's argument that there was 
insufficient evidence to prove that he intentionally or knowingly 
caused Christopher's death is meritless. In a criminal case, 
intent may be inferred from the actions of the defendant or from 
the surrounding circumstances. State v. Murphy. 674 P.2d 1220, 
1223 (Utah 1983) . That defendant picked up Carolyn and 
Christopher Swan in the early morning hours of August 13, 1982 
and drove them to Lark and that they were not seen again until 
their bodies were recovered six and nine days later is 
undisputed. The medical examiner who performed an autopsy on 
Christopher testified that, in her opinion, he was alive when 
placed in the river and died of drowning. She estimated that at 
the time his body was found it had been in the river na week, 
plus or minus a few days" (R. 2358-09). These circumstances, 
coupled with evidence that Carolyn had been killed by gunshots 
shortly after she was last seen, provide an adequate basis from 
which the jury could have reasonably inferred that defendant 
intentionally or knowingly killed Christopher in conjunction with 
intentionally killing Carolyn. 
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Finally, defendant attacks the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting the aggravating circumstances of homicide 
"committed for pecuniary or other personal gain" and homicide 
"committed for the purpose of preventing a witness from 
testifying, or a person from providing evidence, or a person from 
participating in any legal proceedings or official 
investigation." With respect to the first of these aggravating 
circumstances, defendant again asks the Court to ignore credible 
evidence presented by the State and to accept a version of the 
facts most favorable to him. As noted in this brief's statement 
of facts, the State introduced substantial evidence of \ 
defendant's significant financial obligations toward Christopher, 
defendant's failure to pay for Christopher's support, a paternity 
suit filed against defendant regarding Christopher and 
defendant's efforts to avoid it, and defendant's denial of having 
fathered the boy. Moreover, defendant himself admitted at trial 
that, although it was "highly possible" he was Christopher's 
father, he denied paternity to government officials and to his 
fiancee, and he never legally acknowledged or obligated himself 
to the child. He further testified that he only infrequently 
gave Ms. Swan small sums of money for Christopher's support, that 
he realized a paternity suit, if lost, would mean that he would 
be legally obligated for child support, and that as long as 
Carolyn and Christopher were around he would be faced with social 
interference and possible financial obligations. This evidence 
adequately supported the aggravating circumstance of killing for 
pecuniary or personal gain. 
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For many of the same reasonsf the evidence was also 
sufficient to support the second aggravating circumstance. The 
very existence of Christopher would provide evidence in a 
paternity action against defendant. Furthermoref his existence 
could well have tied defendant to the killing of Carolyn Swan. 
In light of the evidence showing that there was a paternity 
action filed against defendant, that Christopher was with Carolyn 
the last time she was seen alive, and that defendant killed 
Carolyn, the jury could have reasonably concluded that defendant 
killed Christopher by throwing him into the river to prevent that 
"person from providing evidence . . . or from participating in 
any legal proceedings or official investigation." The evidence, 
when viewed in its entirety, was legally sufficient to support 
that conclusion. 
In sum, because the evidence was sufficient to support 
the jury's findings that defendant was the person who killed 
Christopher Swan and that he did so intentionally or knowingly 
under either or both of the aggravating circumstances defendant 
attacks on appeal, his conviction of first degree murder for the 
death of Christopher Swan should be upheld. 
B. 
Under § 76-5-202(1) (a) and (h) , the State charged that 
defendant "intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Carolyn 
J. Swan under the following circumstances: (a) At the time that 
the homicide was committed the defendant also committed another 
homicide; or (b) The defendant committed the homicide for the 
purpose of preventing a witness from testifying, or a person from 
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providing evidence or from participating in any legal proceedings 
or official investigation" (R. 125). The jury was instructed 
accordingly (Instruction Nos. 1, 21, 24; R. 3238-9, 3257, 3260) 
Based upon the foregoing discussion of defendant's 
sufficiency claim concerning his conviction for murdering 
Christopher Swan, defendant's further claim that there was 
insufficient evidence to support his first degree murder 
conviction in the death of Carolyn Swan may be disposed of fairly 
quickly. _ 
Defendant first argues that there was insufficient 
evidence to support the double homicide circumstance. However, 
in making this claim, defendant once again asks the Court to 
invade the province of the jury by reevaluating the weight and 
credibility of the State's evidence in support of its theory that 
defendant left work shortly after midnight on August 13, 1982 and 
subsequently killed Carolyn and Christopher Swan—a function this 
Court has repeatedly refused to perform. Thus, for the reasons 
previously discussed, defendant's claim should be rejected. 
Defendant next argues that there was insufficient 
evidence to support a finding that he killed Carolyn to prevent 
her from participating in a paternity action against him. Again, 
defendant chooses to ignore ample evidence presented by the State 
concerning a paternity action filed against defendant by the Salt 
Lake County Attorney's Office, defendant's awareness of that 
fiction, his attempt to avoid the action, his denial of paternity 
to a government official, and his failure to meet various 
financial obligations to Christopher. Instead, he relies upon 
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somewhat conflicting evidence which, he claims, must have raised 
a reasonable doubt in the jurors minds. This, of course, ignores 
the well settled principle that this Court will not reverse a 
conviction on sufficiency grounds merely because contradictory 
evidence or conflicting inferences exist. Howell, 649 P.2d at 
97. Therefore, defendant's sufficiency claim regarding this 
second aggravating circumstance is also without merit. 
Accordingly, the Court should affirm defendant's first degree 
murder conviction for the death of Carolyn Swan. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ADMISSION OF PHOTOGRAPHS OF 
THE VICTIM'S BODIES INTO EVIDENCE WAS NOT 
REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion in limine to 
prevent the State from introducing into evidence at trial 
photographs of the victims' bodies (R. 248, 375-80). The trial 
court heard argument on the motion, took it under advisement, and 
later denied it (R. 670-85, 2907). At trial, defendant objected 
to the admission of State's Exhibits 34 and 59, photographs of 
the bodies of Carolyn and Christopher Swan, but stated that he 
had no objection to State's Exhibit 60, a photograph of a watch 
on Ms. Swan's wrist (R. 1651, 1865, 1960). On appeal, defendant 
argues that the trial court's admission of these three 
photographs constituted reversible error. Because defendant 
stated at trial that he had no objection to Exhibit 60 and thus 
did not preserve an objection to that photograph, see Utah R. 
Evid. 103(a)(1); State v. MnCardell
 f 652 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah 
1982), the State will address defendant's argument only insofar 
as it relates to the admission of Exhibits 34 and 59. 
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It is well settled that "[tlhe trial court's ruling on 
the admissibility of evidence will not be reversed absent a 
showing that the trial court so abused its discretion as to 
create a likelihood that injustice resulted." State v. Royball. 
17 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 17 (Sept. 3, 1985)f citing State V, 
McCardell . 652 P.2d 942, 944 (Utah 1982). With respect to the 
admission of photographs like those at issue here, this Court in 
State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60 (Utah 1983), set forth the following 
rule: 
We have frequently stated and applied 
the rule that color photographs of the body 
of the victim—even photographs that are 
gruesome—are not inadmissible if they are 
probative of essential facts, even though 
they may be cumulative of other evidence. 
663 P.2d at 63. The Court added that "the key consideration in 
the application of this rule has been the relevance of the 
photographs." Xbid. Finally, it stated that the relevance of 
the proposed photographs must be weighed against the risk of 
creating undue prejudice: 
[Tlhe court should determine whether the 
viewing of the photographs by the jury would 
create a substantial danger of undue 
prejudice against the defendant, and if so, 
whether that danger substantially outweighs 
the photographs1 essential evidentiary value. 
The more inflammatory the photograph, the 
greater the need to establish its essential 
evidentiary value, Commonwealth v. 
Scaramuzzino, 455 Pa. at 381, 317 A.2d at 
226, and, conversely, the more essential the 
evidentiary value of the photograph, the 
greater the defendant's burden to require its 
# exclusion on the basis that its inflammatory 
nature would be prejudicial to him. The 
point of the reference to "essential 
evidentiary value" in the context of 
potentially prejudicial photographs of the 
victim's body is that such photographs would 
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generally be inappropriate where the only 
relevant evidence they convey can be put 
before the jury readily and accurately by 
other means not accompanied by the potential 
prejudice. 
663 P.2d at 64 (emphasis in original). Having articulated these 
rules, the Garcia Court went on to hold that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in admitting four photographs which 
showed different angles of a homicide victim bloodied by stab 
wounds. It concluded that those photographs, although gruesomef 
were not overly prejudicial and were relevant to show the area 
where a witness saw the defendant drop the body, to show the 
nature of the victims wounds and thus the defendant's state of 
mind, and to corroborate ^ an expert witness's testimony that 
there was not enough blood on the ground for the stabbing to have 
occurred where the body was found, ibid. 
In its memorandum response to defendant's motion in 
limine and during oral argument to the trial court (R. 677-82f 
2939-47), the State argued that the photograph of Christopher's 
body was highly relevant to showing: (1) that the baby had been 
thrown into the river alive (which would be probative of 
defendant's state of mind)f (2) the length of time the body had 
been in the water (which would be probative on the issue of 
whether he was killed at approximately the same time as Carolyn 
was killed), and (3) that the baby had been thrown into the river 
in the same clothing he wore the last time he was seen alive 
(which also would be probative on the issue of when the killings 
occurred). Additionally, the photograph would corroborate expert 
testimony indicating that the abrasions on the top of the child's 
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head suggested that it had scraped along the bottom of the river 
as the child floated downstream. As for the photograph of 
Carolyn's bodyf in addition to showing the amount of time the 
body had been at the place of discovery (which is relevant to the 
question of whether her death occurred near the time of 
Christophers) , it illustrated the position of the body 
underneath a scrub oak to which it had been dragged—something 
that would clearly be relevant to defendant's state of mind. 
Under these circumstances and given that the photographs could 
not be considered any more "gruesome" than those at issue in 
Garciflf the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 
the photographs into evidence. In shortf if there was no 
reversible error in Garcia, it is difficult to conceive of any 
error here. 
Moreover, even if the trial court did err in admitting 
the challenged photographs, the error was harmless. There simply 
is no reasonable likelihood that without the error there would 
have been a result more favorable to defendant. State v. Wells, 
603 P.2d 810, 813 (Utah 1979) . £££ al^Q. State v. Purcell, 15 
Utah Adv. Rep. 30, 31 (Aug. 8, 1985); State v, Hutchison/ 655 
P.2d 635, 636 (Utah 1982); Utah R. Evid. 103(a) (1985); Utah R. 
Crim. P. 30(a) (UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-30(a) (1982)). 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO PRESENT ANY GROUNDS FOR 
REVERSING HIS CONVICTION BASED UPON THE 
ADMISSION OF CERTAIN EVIDENCE SEIZED DURING 
THE EXECUTION OF TWO ALLEGEDLY INVALID SEARCH , 
WARRANTS. 
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Defendant argues that the trial court committed error 
in refusing to suppress before trial and later admitting at trial 
certain evidence he claims was seized by police officers pursuant 
to two invalid search warrants—one issued and executed on August 
18, 1982 for the search of defendant's impounded truck and one 
issued and executed on August 20, 1982 for the search of 
defendant's and April Alkire's residence. Specifically, 
defendant contends that, because the affidavits of a police 
officer that supported the warrants contained known 
misrepresentations of factf the warrrants were invalid and thus 
soil samples, a gun case, and rifle cartridges seized during the 
execution of the warranty should have been suppressed. However, 
this Court need not reach the question of possible 
misrepresentations in the affidavits in order to resolve the 
suppression issue. 
First, with respect to the soil sample challenged by 
defendant, it was not seized pursuant to the vehicle warrant. In 
his brief, defendant cites to T. 1717 (R. 2454) of the trial 
transcript to identify the soil sample he claims was improperly 
admitted over his objection. Brief of Appellant at 3 8. However, 
that soil sample, which was marked as State's Exhibit 29, was 
obtained during the search of defendant's truck conducted 
pursuant to defendant's permission on August 15, 1982, not during 
the vehicle search conducted on August 18 pursuant to the warrant 
defendant challenges (R. 1671, 2454). Because defendant does not 
challenge the validity of the consent search on the 15th, his 
argument concerning the soil sample he identifies is without 
merit. 
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Second, although the gun case and rifle cartridges were 
seized during the execution of the residence warrant defendant 
challenges, the trial court refused to suppress those items 
pretrial not only because it found the warrant valid, but also on 
the alternative ground that the search of the residence was 
lawfully conducted pursuant to consent for the search given to 
the police by April Alkire (R. 514-5, 554; Amended Findings of 
Facts and Conclusions of Law—R. 3093).4 At trial, defendant did 
not challenge the pretrial ruling concerning consent when the gun 
case and rifle cartridges were offered as evidence, nor does he 
challenge that ruling here (R. 1346, 2131). Therefore, even 
assuming, arguendo, that defendant's contention concerning the 
defects in the affidavit supporting the warrant is correct, the 
trial court, which had before it nothing more than defendant's 
general objections to the gun case and rifle cartridges,^ could 
have properly admitted those items at trial on the ground that 
they were validly seized pursuant to a consent search—a ground 
defendant does not ask this Court to review. 
4
 Defendant's pretrial motions to suppress were heard and decided 
by Judge James S. Sawaya, a district court judge, who did not 
preside over defendant's trial (Judge Banks sat for trial). 
5
 There is some question whether defendant adequately objected to 
the admission of those items at trial. As previously noted, 
Judge Banks, who presided at trial, did not hear or decide 
defendant's pretrial motions to suppress. In order to have given 
Judge Banks an opportunity to consider adequatly defendant's 
objections, defendant should have entered more specific 
objections than ones based merely on prior motions (R. 1346-7, 
2131). £££ State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 81-2 (Utah 1983); Utah 
R. Evid. 103(a)(1) (1985). 
-26-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Finally, although defendant argues that it was error 
for the trial court not to suppress this evidence, he completely 
fails to address the critical question of whether this alleged 
error would require reversal. In that "ttlhe trial court's 
ruling on the admissibility of evidence will not be reversed 
absent a showing that the trial court so abused its discretion as 
to create a likelihood that injustice resulted," State v. 
Royball. 17 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 17 (Sept. 3, 1985), defendant is 
obligated to show that without the error there would have been a 
result more favorable to him. State v. Purcell, 15 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 30, 32 (Aug. 8, 1985); State v. Hutchison, 655 P.2d 635, 636 
(Utah 1982); Utah R. Evid 103(a) (1985); Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a). 
£££ SlJSa State v. Griffin. 626 P.2d 478, 483 (Utah 1981) 
(Wilkins, J., concurring in the result) (holding that 
introduction of fruits of unlawful search and seizure was 
harmless error, in that there was sufficient untainted evidence 
to sustain the defendants' convictions). In the absence of any 
argument from defendant on this question, it must be assumed that 
he is unable to advance an effective claim of reversible error. 
For the reasons stated above, defendant's assignments 
of error are without merit. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR WHEN IT 
DEATH QUALIFIED THE JURY. 
In Point IV of his brief, defendant argues that the 
tfial court erred in death qualifying the jury in accordance with 
Utah and federal law, s&S. State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 237 (Utah 
1985), £itins UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-18 (e) (10) (1982) and 
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Witherspoon v. Illinois. 391 U.S. 510 (1968), because death 
qualification allegedly creates juries that are unrepresentative 
of the community at large and conviction prone. An identical 
argument was considered and rejected by this Court in State v. 
Moore. 697 P.2d at 237-8. Defendant argues that MoQJL£ was 
wrongly decided, but presents no more compelling authority for 
his position than was presented to the Court in Moore (see Brief 
of Appellant in State v. Moore. Case No. 18737, at 16-26). His 
citation to Grigsby v. Mabry. 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. 
granted, suh nom. Lockhart v. McCree (case No. 84-1865), 
U.S. (1985), is to a case that represents a clear minority v 
position. The majority, and better reasoned, view is that 
adopted in Moore and by numerous courts throughout the country. 
£££, e.g.r Keeten v. Garrison, 742 F.2d 129 (4th cir. 1984); 
Commonwealth v. Morales. 494 A.2d 367, 374-5 (Pa. 1985); 
Commonwealth v. Boggsr 331 S.E. 2d 407, 417 (va. 1985); People v. 
Collins and Bracey, 106 111.2d 237, 478 N.E.2d 267, 285-6 (1985); 
State v. Blount, 472 A.2d 1340, 1346-7 (Del. Sup. 1984); £gapl£ 
v. Fields. 35 Cal.3d 329, 197 Cal. Rptr. 803, 673 P.2d 680 : 
(1983); Hovey v. Superior Court. 28 Cal. 3d 1, 168 Cal. Rptr. 
128, 616 P.2de 1301 (1980). Accordingly, the Court should reject 
defendant's argument as having been properly disposed of in 
VLQQUZ. 
6
 The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in this 
case and will likely resolve the death qualification issue 
presented by defendant. 
-28-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Although in Part D of his Point IV defendant complains 
about how the process of death qualification worked to exclude 
one prospective juror, he does not appear to argue that her 
exclusion constituted reversible error. He appears to use her 
only as an example of how the process works. In any eventf a 
review of the record indicates that she was properly excluded for 
cause (R. 1081-90). SPE Wainwright v. Witt, U.S. , 105 
S.Ct. 844 (1985). 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH THE JURY VENIRE. 
During jury selectionf defendant filed a motion to have 
the entire jury venire quashed on the basis of an alleged 
systematic exclusion of racial and ethnic minorities from venires 
in Salt Lake County in violation of the fair-cross-section 
requirement. (R. 3176-82). After a brief discussion on the 
motionf the trial court denied it (R. 1150-2). On appeal, 
defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible error 
in not granting a hearing on the motion and in denying it. 
Neither of these claims is meritorious. 
As an initial matter, the inadequacy of the motion 
itself would justify the court's action. The figures relied upon 
in defendant's motion to support the contention that Salt Lake 
County's process of selecting jury panels from the voter rolls 
results in an impermissible, systematic exclusion of Hispanics 
from those panels were completely undocumented. No affidavits or 
other verifying documents were attached. Under these 
circumstances, any court would be justified in summarily denying 
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the motion. Furthermore, defendant cannot fairly argue on appeal 
that the trial court committed a procedural error in not holding 
a hearing on the motion when defendant failed to even request a 
hearing on the matter (R. 1150-2)
 f 3176-82). See State v. 
Steggell. 660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983) (the Court will not 
consider issues raised for the first time on appeal). Defendant 
effectively asked the Court to quash the jury venire on the basis 
of his written motion alone. 
Even if the accuracy of defendant's figures is assumed, 
the trial court did not improperly deny the motion to quash. It 
is well settled that in order to establish a prima facie \ 
violation of the Sixth Amendment's fair-cross-section 
requirement, a defendant must show: 
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is 
a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) 
that the representation of this group in 
venires from which juries are selected is not 
fair and reasonable in relation to the number 
of such persons in the community; and (3) 
that this underrepresentation is due to 
systematic exclusion of the group in the 
jury-selection process. 
Dnren v. Missouri. 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). Assuming, for 
purposes of argument, that Hispanics are a "distinctive group" in 
the community, see People v. Harris. 36 Cal.3d 36, 201 Cal. Rptr. 
782, 679 P.2d 433, 440-1 (1984), the statistics cited by 
defendant fail to show a violation of the second and third prongs 
of the HjULLfiH test. Defendant focuses entirely on a comparative 
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disparity figure of 56.6%7 to support his claim that there is 
unconstitutional underrepresentation of Hispanics on jury panels 
in Salt Lake County. However, comparative disparity should not 
be the only figure considered. The more important figure is 
absolute disparity—that is, the difference between the 
percentage of eligible Hispanics in the community and the 
percentage of Hispanics on the jury panels. 2&S. United States v. 
EafSUr 726 F.2d 21, 23 (1st Cir. 1984), si&lt. denied. 104 S.Ct. 
217 9. As noted by the Hafen court: 
Although we acknowledge the possibility 
that the comparative disparity calculation 
might be a useful supplement to the absolute 
disparity calculation in some circumstances, 
we do not believe that it necessarily 
produces a more accurate result where, as 
here, the group allegedly underrepresented 
forms a very small proportion of the total 
population. In fact, the smaller the group 
is, the more the comparative disparity figure 
distorts the proportional representation. 
For example, in an area that had 500,000 
whites and only one black eligible to serve 
as jurors, a random selection system that 
failed to place the single black on the 
master wheel would produce a 100 per cent 
comparative disparity, even though an all 
white jury would clearly form a "fair cross 
section" of the community. We agree with the 
conclusions of the court in United States v, 
Whitley, 491 F.2d 1248 (8th Cir. 1974), that 
the comparative disparity calculation "is 
ordinarily inappropriate where a very small 
proportion of the population is black" and 
1
 Although defendant does not cite the source of his formula for 
calculating comparative disparity (Brief of Appellant at 69, n. 
13), the State will assume, for purposes of this brief, that it 
is an acceptable formula. 5J£E People v. Sepeda, 581 P.2d 723, 
728 (Colo. 1978). However, the Court should be aware that at 
least one slightly different formula has been used which, if 
employed in this case, would result in a lower comparative 
disparity figure. &££, e.g.. United States v. Hafen, 726 F.2d 
27, 23 (1st Cir. 1984), ££JLt. denifijdr 104 S.Ct. 2179. 
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that "in such a circumstance [it] distorts 
reality". Id. at 1249. 
726 F.2d at 24. This analysis is particularly applicable to 
defendant's argumentf since Hispanics make up a very small 
proportion of the population in Salt Lake County. Using 
defendant's figures, there is an absolute disparity of only 
2.82%, which is not sufficient to show underrepresentation. 
ILaf£llf 726 F.2d at 21 (no underrepresentation where comparative 
disparity was 54.2% but absolute disparity was only 2.02%), and 
cases cited therein. See .al££ United States v. Yazzie, 660 F.2d 
422 (10th Cir. 1982) , JC£X±. denied, 455 U.S. 923; State v. 
Hilliard. 89 Wash.2d 430, 573 P.2d 22, 28-9 (1977). Therefore, 
the cases cited by defendant in support of his argument are 
distinguishable. &££ Jiuien (comparative disparity of 
approximately 72% and an absolute disparity of approximately 
39%); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 4 82 (1976) (a comparative 
disparity of 50.6% and an absolute disparity of 40%); People v. 
Harris (comparative disparity of 56.3% for Blacks and 87.7% for 
Hispanics, and an absolute disparity of 7.1% for Blacks and 24.2% 
for Hispanics). 
• 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendant's 
convictions should be affirmed. __££——~~~ 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this & day of January, 
1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON (/ 
Assistant Attorney General 
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